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Pay-for-Performance in Nursing Homes 
Becky A. Briesacher, Ph.D., Terry S. Field, D.Sc., Joann Baril, and Jerry H. Gurwitz, M.D. 
Information on the impact of pay-for-per­
formance programs is lacking in the nursing 
home setting. This literature review (1980­
2007) identified 13 prior examples of pay-for­
performance programs in the nursing home 
setting: 7 programs were active as of 2007, 
while 6 had been terminated. The programs 
were mostly short-lived, varied considerably 
in the choice of performance measures and 
pay incentives, and evaluations of the impact 
were rare. 
review oF tHe literature 
More than 3 million frail and disabled in­
dividuals will rely on services provided by 
a nursing home at some point during the 
year, and among them 1.5 million will stay 
long enough to consider the nursing home 
their main residence (Doshi, Shaffer, and 
Briesacher, 2005). These individuals, their 
families, and their friends count on nursing 
homes to provide care that is of high qual­
ity. However, as of 2006, one in five nursing 
homes nationwide was cited for serious 
deficiencies—deficiencies that caused ac­
tual harm or placed residents in imme­
diate jeopardy (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services 2006; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2007). 
One strategy for improving the quality of 
care in nursing homes is to link health care 
spending to quality and efficiency through 
The authors are with the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School and Meyers Primary Care Institute, Worcester, Massa­
chusetts. The research in this article was prepared with support 
from Commonwealth Medicine, the public service healthcare 
consulting division of the University of Massachusetts Medical 
School. The statements expressed in this article are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of 
the University of Massachusetts Medical School, Meyers Pri­
mary Care Institute, or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS). 
pay-for-performance programs. Pay-for per­
formance is a reimbursement approach 
designed to reward health care providers 
for achieving high levels of performance, 
or improvements in performance. This ap­
proach is in contrast to fee schedules of flat 
rates per service, where reimbursement 
is the highest when the most services are 
rendered, regardless of improved patient 
outcomes. In 2001, the Institute of Medicine 
identified payment systems based on only 
the quantity of care provided as a bar­
rier to quality improvement and recom­
mended that health care purchasers adopt 
reimbursement policies linked to quality 
improvement (Committee on Quality of 
Health Care in America and Institute of 
Medicine, 2001). Approximately one-half 
of all Medicaid Programs currently oper­
ate some type of pay-for-performance pro­
gram, and 85 percent have plans to do so 
within 5 years (Kuhmerker and Hartman, 
2007). Pay-for-performance programs in 
the nursing home setting have been rare; 
two recent surveys identified only four 
active programs (Georgia, Iowa, Vermont, 
and Utah) (White et al., 2006; Kuhmerker 
and Hartman, 2007). However, this will 
soon be changing as CMS, the largest 
purchaser of nursing home services (about 
$64 billion per year), will be sponsoring a 
pay-for-performance initiative through the 
Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing 
Demonstration (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid, 2008, 2006). Beginning in the 
summer of 2009, the pay-for-performance 
demonstration will include as many as 50 
nursing homes per State in 4 host States. 
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Information on pay-for-performance pro­
grams in the nursing home setting is lack­
ing, both on details of the programs as well 
as evaluations of any impacts. Research 
conducted in other health care settings 
find inconsistent improvements with pay­
for-performance programs, both in terms 
of process measures of care (e.g., screen­
ing rates) and patient outcomes (Rosenthal 
and Frank, 2005; Petersen et al., 2006; Felt-
Lisk, Gimm, and Petersen, 2007; Gilmore 
et al., 2007). For example, a recent analysis 
of pay-for-performance in the acute care 
setting found no significant differences in 
the quality of care or outcomes of patients 
with myocardial infarctions (Rosenthal and 
Frank 2005; Glickman et al., 2007). The 
lack of significant quality improvements 
in these different settings raises questions 
about the potential for similarly lackluster 
results in nursing homes. The objective 
of this study was to review the empiri­
cal literature to characterize current and 
former pay-for-performance programs in 
the nursing home setting and to compare 
the performance measures, pay incen­
tives, and any evaluations of the impact of
these programs. 
MetHodS 
Conceptual Framework 
Our conceptual framework for this re­
view is an adaptation of the work by 
Rosenthal and Frank (2006). Within that 
framework, improving quality of care is 
addressed through a payment system that 
makes increasing quality in the best fi­
nancial interest of the provider of care. 
However, a successful payment system re­
quires good information to create a reward 
that is commensurate with the costs to 
the provider of increasing quality. Since 
information on the true costs of increasing 
quality is often lacking, a poorly designed 
payment system may have no effect on 
quality or even unintended negative effects. 
Thus, we probed the literature for valid 
evidence of the overall effectiveness of pay­
for-performance in the nursing home set­
ting. In addition, we were also interested in 
documenting the design elements of prior 
pay-for-performance programs in nursing 
homes to characterize key elements and 
current trends. 
SearCH Strategy 
We conducted searches of the electron­
ic database MEDLINE and the Internet 
using Google U.S. Government Search 
for empirical data describing pay-for-per­
formance programs in nursing homes. In 
addition, we interviewed key stakehold­
ers to supplement the search. The review 
covered the period 1980-August 2007. The 
initial search strategy for MEDLINE in­
cluded the subject heading nursing homes
in combination with the term quality and 
the reimbursement terms of pay-for-per­
formance, value, purchasing, incentive, or 
payment. As primary documents or review 
articles were identified, we scanned the 
text for mention of programs, and reviewed 
the reference lists for additional sources. A 
modified search was applied for the Web 
search, which was limited to Web sites 
with downloadable files (Adobe Acrobat® 
PDF, Microsoft Word® or Microsoft Power-
Point®). Lastly, five interviews were con­
ducted with key stakeholders from aca­
demia, Minnesota’s department of human
services, CMS, MedPAC, and the De­
partment of Veterans Affairs to learn about 
additional programs. All investigators de­
veloped the search strategy, retrieved the 
documents and extracted the data, con­
ducted the interviews, and made the final 
selection of programs. 
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Study SeleCtion 
The pay-for-performance programs were
selected if they met four criteria: (1) the 
program had been implemented as a func­
tioning payment system, (2) the program 
was set in the nursing home setting, (3) the 
program used measures of performance 
related to quality rather than only efficien­
cy, and (4) the performance incentive was 
financial, rather than recognition-based. 
Programs were excluded if the financial 
incentives were not tied to reimbursement 
rates, but instead awarded as grants. Those 
programs generally award the grants retro­
actively so the relationship between perfor­
mance and financial incentives is less clear. 
For instance, in Vermont’s Gold Star pro­
gram, high performing nursing homes are 
eligible for quality awards of $25,000 but 
the award is not guaranteed. In addition, 
we limited the review to only programs 
conducted in the U.S. 
reSultS 
The Medline search identified 75 articles 
related to pay-for-performance in nursing 
homes and the Web search identified 134 
online documents. Of these, only 19 re­
lated to our study objective, and 18 met the 
inclusion criteria. A manual review of these 
documents and the interviews produced 
four more programs. Key characteristics 
of the final programs are summarized in 
Table 1. 
We identified 13 pay-for-performance
programs in the nursing home setting
between 1980 and 2007: 7 programs were 
currently active as of 2007, while 6 had
been terminated. All of the current pro­
grams were relatively new, with the old­
est program dating back to 2002 (Iowa’s
Accountability Measures Incentive Pro­
gram). Nearly all of the terminated pro­
grams were short-lived. For example, Texas 
implemented a performance-based add-on 
payment program for nursing homes in 
2001 but 2 years later ended the program 
due to budget cuts (Carter, 2002). The 
reasons for the other terminations were 
not documented. Most (5 of 13) of the pro­
grams were set in the Central/Midwestern 
States, 4 in the South, 3 in the West, and 
only 1 in the Northeast. Participation was 
voluntary in all programs except for two, 
Georgia and Iowa. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of active pay-for-performance 
programs in nursing homes from 1980
to 2007. 
evaluationS 
Only 4 of the 13 programs evaluated the 
impact of the program, and among them 
only one provided sufficiently robust evi­
dence for drawing any clear conclusions. 
In the early 1980s, 32 San Diego nurs­
ing homes were randomly assigned into 
a control group or an experiment group 
with incentive payments for: (1) accepting 
patients needing the most functional as­
sistance, (2) improved patient functional 
status within 90 days of admission, and 
(3) prompt discharges of patients who re­
mained out of the facility for at least 90 
days (Norton, 1992; Trisolini et al., 2006) 
The study tracked over 11,000 nursing 
home residents for 2-1/2 years, and found 
the incentive payments associated with 
beneficial effects. Nursing homes eligible 
for the incentive payment program were 
more likely to admit individuals with se­
vere disabilities and more likely to send 
individuals home or to lower skilled facili­
ties than nursing homes receiving only the
per diems. In addition, residents in the ex­
periment group nursing homes were less 
likely to be hospitalized or to die than those 
in the control group homes. However, this 
promising result came at a cost—the aver­
age daily cost to Medicaid rose by about
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5 percent, due to the incentive payments 
and increased administrative burdens. 
Studies with less rigorous research de­
sign found modest or no impact of the 
pay-for-performance program. In Illinois’s 
Quality Incentive Program, the evalua­
tion failed to find that the incentive pay­
ment influenced overall costs, Medicaid 
access, facility efficiencies, or improved 
resident care (Geron, 1991). Similarly, the 
evaluation of Massachusetts’ pay-for-per­
formance program also found no relation­
ship between the incentive payment and 
improvement of quality (Willemain, 1983). 
However, in Iowa, the nursing homes dem­
onstrated modest improvement in resident 
satisfaction, staffing and employee reten­
tion after implementation of the pay-for­
performance program (Kane, Arling, and 
Mueller, 2007). 
MeaSureS 
Table 1 summarizes the measures of 
performance that generally fall into eight 
major domains: staffing (e.g., low staff turn­
over); performance on certification survey 
(e.g., deficiency-free inspection); quality in­
dicators from the Minimum Data Set (e.g., 
no physical restraints or no new pressure 
ulcers); facility efficiency (e.g., occupancy 
and operating costs); service to Medicaid 
enrollees; resident and family satisfaction; 
resident quality of life (e.g., privacy and 
comfort); and other outcomes (e.g., timely 
discharge and improved functioning). No 
program covers all of these domains, al­
though Oklahoma’s Focus on Excellence 
program and Minnesota’s Quality-Add-on 
program assesses performance on six of 
the eight areas (Nursing Facility Rates and 
Policy Division, 2006; Oklahoma Health 
Care Authority, 2007). (It should be noted 
Figure 1
�
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that Minnesota’s program was initially 
implemented using only a portion of the 
complete list of quality measures.) More 
than one-half of these measures came from 
data already collected in the CMS survey­
ing process, such as total compliance with 
State and Federal regulations for certified 
nursing homes. A few of the measures 
required new data collection, as is the 
case with the resident quality of life as­
sessment in Minnesota’s program, which 
costs the State about $700,000 each year. 
Also, Oklahoma’s program uses its own 
measures of resident outcomes that are 
not derived from the Minimum Data Set. 
Figure 2 shows that the active programs 
most often define performance in terms 
of staffing, the certification survey, and 
resident satisfaction. In comparison, the 
older inactive programs showed more het­
erogeneity with few programs assessing 
performance using the same measures. 
inCentiveS 
The incentive payments in the pay-for­
performance programs varied modestly, 
ranging from a low of a $0.25 flat bonus 
per patient day to a high of a 5 percent in­
crease in the daily per diem rate (Table 1). 
The rationale for the level of the incentive 
payment (whether there was any relation­
ship to the costs of improving care) was 
poorly documented, and the proportion 
of providers receiving the incentive pay­
ment varied considerably. The proportion 
of eligible homes earning the incentive 
payment in any year ranged from 38 to 87 
percent, and total expenditures generally 
varied according to the number of eligible 
homes. For example, at the end of the first 
year of Texas’ Performance-based Add-On 
Payment program, 57.8 percent of 1,020 
nursing homes in the State had earned 
the incentive payment, for a total cost of 
Figure 2
�
Proportion of Programs with Performance Measures in Major Domains
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$4 million (Carter, 2002). Otherwise, the 
annual expenditures for the programs 
ranged from $500,000 (Utah’s Nursing 
Home Quality Improvement Initiative) 
to $20 million (Illinois Quality Incentive 
Program). The source of the incentive pay­
ments was also poorly documented, such
as whether they represented a new allo­
cation of funds or a reallocation of other 
nursing home funds. 
diSCuSSion 
In our review, we found that few pay-for­
performance programs have occurred in 
the nursing home setting since 1990, and 
even fewer have lasted more than a few 
years. Among the seven programs that are 
currently operational, three were initiated 
in 2007 and the oldest program is in its 
sixth year of operation. 
We found little empirical evidence that
pay-for-performance programs increase 
the quality of care of residents or the ef­
ficiency of that care in nursing homes.
However, the program set in San Diego did 
find benefits, and it used the strongest of
all evaluation designs, a randomized 
control design. This provocative find­
ing deserves a more current replication. 
The disappointing results from the other 
programs are difficult to explain but may 
be related to barriers specific to this set­
ting of care. According to our conceptual 
framework, the incentive payment must 
be sufficient to reward providers after ac­
counting for the costs to improve care. For
nursing homes already strained by high 
turnover among staff and administrators
or ownership profits, the costs of improv­
ing care, such as implementing health in­
formation technology may far exceed the
incentive payment. 
Our review also revealed that nearly all 
of the programs were developed indepen­
dently so there was modest agreement 
across the design elements of the pro­
grams and no clear state-of-the art trends. 
In most cases the performance measures 
are derived from existing data collection 
efforts related to State and Federal certi­
fication surveys. In addition to problems 
with accuracy and timeliness, these sourc­
es limit measurement options to a few com­
ponents of quality with clear relationships 
to resident outcomes. Important quality is­
sues such as the quality of life of residents 
and the satisfaction of residents and their 
families with nursing home care require 
additional data collection, increasing the 
cost of these programs. 
Several limitations of this review should 
be noted. Pay-for-performance is an evolv­
ing concept, so standard terminology 
was sometimes lacking and descriptions 
of current activity were limited. For in­
stance, the terms value-based purchasing 
and pay-for-performance were treated as 
synonymous, while quality recognition 
programs were handled on a case-by-case 
basis. Documentation of these programs 
was very limited. For instance, in the case 
of Utah, we could identify that a program 
had been initiated in 2004 but could find 
no subsequent information on the perfor­
mance. In fact, this review raised more 
questions than answers. We could iden­
tify that many programs were short-lived 
but could rarely find the reasons for the 
terminations. Lastly, any assessment of 
current pay-for-performance activity will 
quickly become outdated. Our assessment 
can serve only as snapshot of the historical 
trends and evidence base for these pro­
grams before CMS invites participation in 
its nursing home demonstration. 
Using financial incentives to encourage 
quality of healthcare is an increasingly 
popular approach to improving quality. 
That most of these programs in nursing 
homes have been terminated after a few 
years of operation sends an important 
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warning that these approaches must be 
very carefully designed, although the rea­
sons for these terminations are not clear 
and may be related more to lack of political 
viability rather than practical viability. At 
least one program had to be significantly 
scaled back in response to pressure from 
the State’s nursing home industry, an im­
portant constituency of State lawmakers 
(Kane, Arling, and Mueller, 2007). With the 
current lack of evidence to support the de­
sign and implementation of such programs, 
payers considering pay-for-performance in 
this setting should carefully consider the 
specific areas of performance and quality 
of most concern, review the capacity of the 
target nursing homes to actually accom­
plish the quality goals, involve the local 
nursing home industry in the design of the 
program from the beginning, and track all 
of the potential intended and unintended 
consequences of the program. 
What can policymakers learn from this 
review, especially in terms of assessing 
the CMS Nursing Home Value-Based Pur­
chasing Demonstration (NHVBP)? First, 
rigorous evaluations of the impact of pay­
for-performance are almost nonexistent in 
the nursing home setting, yet they are 
critical for understanding the implications 
of this policy. It is reassuring to see that 
the NHVBP will employ an experimen­
tal design with randomized assignment of 
participating nursing homes into treatment 
and control groups and has contracted 
for an independent evaluation. Second, 
improvement in residents’ outcomes and 
costs savings have been documented in 
only one program (in San Diego in the 
1980s). Yet, the NHVBP demonstration 
requires cost savings expected to result 
from decreases in hospitalizations and 
skilled nursing facility stays and other sav­
ings, otherwise incentive payments are not 
awarded. The design of this payment sys­
tem places a considerable burden on the 
provider to increase quality that ensures 
Medicare savings, and this is a burden 
unlike that of the other programs in our 
review. Third, the state of measuring qual­
ity in nursing homes has evolved to include
informative domains such as resident qual­
ity of life and consumer satisfaction. The 
CMS demonstration is initially focused on 
the traditional measures of staffing (levels 
and stability), MDS based-quality measures,
survey deficiencies, and inappropriate hos­
pitalizations. The one exception in this list 
is the measure of inappropriate hospitali­
zations, although the validity and reliability
of this measure in the nursing home setting
is yet unclear. It should be noted, though,
that resident satisfaction has been listed as 
a potential measure for future years of the
demonstration (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid 2008). Lastly, the small number 
of prior programs, many of which were ter­
minated, suggests that potentially serious 
barriers exist to implementing and sustain­
ing pay-for-performance programs in this 
setting. It would be beneficial if the CMS 
demonstration would include a thought­
ful assessment of these barriers, particu­
larly which factors would be important to 
maintaining a pay-for-performance program 
after the demonstration is concluded. 
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